Job Market Paper
You can view a working version of my job market paper here.
My dissertation, "Nationalism and Redistribution in New Democracies: Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes," investigates the micro-level underpinnings that sustain weak welfare system in developmental states. I argue that authoritarian leaders who encounter twin challenges of nation-building and modernization tend to utilize nationalism as an effective ruling and mobilizing strategy for national development. As a result, nationalism shaped under the authoritarianism can embed pro-development norms, which can powerfully shape citizens' preferences for redistribution even after democratization. I test my theoretical argument using a mixed-method approach, including in-depth interview, survey experiment, and cross-national survey data analysis.
My dissertation, "Nationalism and Redistribution in New Democracies: Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes," investigates the micro-level underpinnings that sustain weak welfare system in developmental states. I argue that authoritarian leaders who encounter twin challenges of nation-building and modernization tend to utilize nationalism as an effective ruling and mobilizing strategy for national development. As a result, nationalism shaped under the authoritarianism can embed pro-development norms, which can powerfully shape citizens' preferences for redistribution even after democratization. I test my theoretical argument using a mixed-method approach, including in-depth interview, survey experiment, and cross-national survey data analysis.
Title
"Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes and Redistribution Preferences: Mixed-Method Evidence from South Korea"
Summary
Why does democratization not necessarily lead to generous welfare states? Does Confucianism really hamper the expansion of welfare policies particularly in East Asian democracies? To answer these questions, in this study, I develop a new theory about public opinion on redistribution in new democracies by focusing on nationalist legacies of the past authoritarian regime. I argue that because authoritarian leaders likely utilize nationalism as an effective ideology for national economic development, citizens can shape nationalism and establish pro-development norms based on it, which persist even after a regime transition. Hence, those with higher levels of nationalism are likely to internalize pro-development values as personal norms and decrease their support for welfare because they regard demanding more redistribution as an obstacle to national economic development and even a betrayal of the nation. Moreover, I predict the pattern will appear more salient among those who directly experienced the past regime. My findings from a mixed-methods approach – a combination of in-depth interviews and survey analysis in South Korea – support my argument.
My research makes several significant contributions. First, it helps answer the question of why democratization does not necessarily lead to higher levels of redistribution by demonstrating that democratization is not a clear departure from the past. Second, though the conventional wisdom suggests that cultural uniqueness (e.g., Confucianism) results in small welfare states in East Asia, my theory offers an alternative explanation, above and beyond the cultural perspective, on why East Asians still adhere to national economic development while regarding generous welfare as an obstacle to it and even a betrayal of the nation. Third, unlike the advanced democracies, my theory sheds new light on an entirely different underlying mechanism through which nationalism shapes redistribution attitudes in new democracies. Fourth, because nationalism in my theory is considered social norms that define what is right or wrong in terms of national economy, I claim that it is not simply empty vessels but, instead, it contains meaningful contents such as norms and values from its historical trajectories.
"Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes and Redistribution Preferences: Mixed-Method Evidence from South Korea"
Summary
Why does democratization not necessarily lead to generous welfare states? Does Confucianism really hamper the expansion of welfare policies particularly in East Asian democracies? To answer these questions, in this study, I develop a new theory about public opinion on redistribution in new democracies by focusing on nationalist legacies of the past authoritarian regime. I argue that because authoritarian leaders likely utilize nationalism as an effective ideology for national economic development, citizens can shape nationalism and establish pro-development norms based on it, which persist even after a regime transition. Hence, those with higher levels of nationalism are likely to internalize pro-development values as personal norms and decrease their support for welfare because they regard demanding more redistribution as an obstacle to national economic development and even a betrayal of the nation. Moreover, I predict the pattern will appear more salient among those who directly experienced the past regime. My findings from a mixed-methods approach – a combination of in-depth interviews and survey analysis in South Korea – support my argument.
My research makes several significant contributions. First, it helps answer the question of why democratization does not necessarily lead to higher levels of redistribution by demonstrating that democratization is not a clear departure from the past. Second, though the conventional wisdom suggests that cultural uniqueness (e.g., Confucianism) results in small welfare states in East Asia, my theory offers an alternative explanation, above and beyond the cultural perspective, on why East Asians still adhere to national economic development while regarding generous welfare as an obstacle to it and even a betrayal of the nation. Third, unlike the advanced democracies, my theory sheds new light on an entirely different underlying mechanism through which nationalism shapes redistribution attitudes in new democracies. Fourth, because nationalism in my theory is considered social norms that define what is right or wrong in terms of national economy, I claim that it is not simply empty vessels but, instead, it contains meaningful contents such as norms and values from its historical trajectories.
