

**Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes and Redistribution Preferences:
Mixed-Method Evidence from South Korea**

Job Market Paper

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Abstract

Why does democratization not necessarily lead to generous welfare states, particularly in the third-wave democracies? For instance, although most East Asian democracies have high levels of ethnic homogeneity and strong nationalism, they sustain small welfare states. Using the case of South Korea, I develop a novel theory about how nationalist legacies shape public beliefs about redistribution. I argue that when confronted with twin challenges of nation-building and modernization, authoritarian leaders utilize nationalism as an effective ideology for economic development. As a result, citizens become infused with pro-development norms based on nationalism. Hence, those with higher levels of national identification are likely to have weaker support for redistribution because they regard demanding more redistribution as a betrayal of the nation. Moreover, I predict the pattern will be more robust among those who directly experienced the past regime. My findings from a mixed-methods approach – a combination of in-depth interviews and survey analysis in South Korea – support my argument. This study contributes not only to the literature on small welfare states in new democracies, but also to the identity-based theories about redistribution.

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Introduction

In South Korea in 2012, the 78-year-old widow committed suicide in front of her city hall because officials stopped her welfare checks of about 350 dollars (US) per month (*The New York Times* 2013). Her suicide note said, “People make a law, but how can you do this to me?” Numerous examples have shown that South Korea, one of the leading Asian democracies, suffers from high levels of poverty, inequality, and even suicide rate especially among older people (*The Forbes* 2015; *The Guardian* 2017; *The Reuters* 2022). Despite its successful economic development and democratization, why is South Korea’s welfare state small?¹ More broadly, why does democratization not necessarily lead to generous welfare states, especially in the third-wave democracies? If ethnic diversity erodes welfare states, why do some countries with high levels of ethnic homogeneity, such as South Korea, sustain small welfare states? In East Asia, does Confucianism really hamper the expansion of welfare policies particularly?

Though scholars have paid close attention to welfare states and public opinion on inequality and redistribution for a long time (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Aarøe and Petersen 2014; Trump 2018), the existing theories cannot provide appropriate answers to these questions. In particular, because previous studies rely too heavily on the Western advanced democracies both theoretically and empirically, we know less about small welfare states and public opinion on redistribution in new democracies. To address these limitations, I develop a novel theory about the micro-foundation of public

¹ According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), South Korea spent only about 12.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on social welfare in 2019. This is lower than not only the U.S. (18.7%), but also Israel (16.3%) and Lithuania (16.7%), both of which have similar levels of income inequality. Instead, South Korea’s social spending is similar to that of Turkey (12.0%), Chile (11.4%), and Columbia (13.1%).

attitudes toward redistribution in the third-wave democracies.

By focusing on nationalist legacies of the past authoritarian regime, I argue that when confronted with twin challenges of nation-building and modernization, authoritarian regimes are likely to utilize nationalism as an effective ideology for economic development. As a result, citizens become infused with pro-development norms based on the nationalism. I expect those with higher levels of national identification in these new democracies are likely to exhibit weaker support for redistribution because they perceive demanding more redistribution as a betrayal of the nation. I also predict the negative relationship between nationalism and preferences for redistribution will be more robust among those who directly experienced the past regime. I test my theory in the context of South Korea using a mixed-method approach. I first provide qualitative evidence based on in-depth interviews, and then conduct a quantitative analysis with a nationally representative survey. Both analyses support my theory about the relationship between nationalism and redistributive preferences in new democracies.

This study provides several broad implications not only for the literature on welfare states in new democracies but also for the identity-based theories about redistribution. First, my theory helps answer the question of why democratization does not necessarily lead to higher levels of redistribution in the third-wave democracies (Ross 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Holland 2017). Though it has been widely assumed that democracies are better than autocracies in terms of providing generous welfare policies due to the pursuit of democratic values such as equality and fairness (Dahl 1971; Meltzer and Richard 1981; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Albertus and Menaldo 2014), my theory suggests that democratization is not a clear departure from the past authoritarianism. Instead, it posits that individuals' political attitudes formed during the past regime are not easy to change despite democratization because

of accumulated stock of political regime. Hence, the way that nationalism shapes attitudes toward redistribution depends on the norms and values of the authoritarian period during which individuals have formed their nationalism especially in the third-wave democracies, where nation-building and modernization were intertwined.

Second, some scholars interested in small welfare states in East Asia have provided cultural explanation. They explained that because Confucianism is a fundamental cultural basis of the way that East Asians think and behave, they tend to rely on support and welfare services provided by their own family members rather than state welfare (Rose and Shiratori 1986; Shin and Shaw 2003). However, my theory based on national socialization provides an alternative explanation, above and beyond the cultural perspective, on why East Asians who experienced the authoritarian developmental states still adhere to national economic development while regarding generous welfare as an obstacle to it and even a betrayal of the nation.

Third, when it comes to the identity-based explanation on redistribution, this study goes beyond the existing literature that regards shared ethnic and racial identities just as social categories differentiating between in-group and out-group members for redistribution (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). Instead, national identification in my theory is considered norms that contain meaningful values and contents defining what is right or wrong. Lastly, I provide a novel theoretical explanation about the underlying mechanism by which nationalism is related to redistributive preferences (Shayo 2009). Though my empirical prediction is not different from prior studies, I claim that the negative relationship in the Western advanced democracies comes from *detachment* from economy, whereas the same pattern in new democracies, as my theory suggests, comes from *attachment* to economy.

Nationalism and Preferences for Redistribution in New Democracies

Prior Studies

Scholars have tried to explain who prefers redistribution and why for a long time. In addition to traditional theories based on economic explanations (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ansell 2014), there is a literature that relies on identity politics. Some scholars, including Alesina and Glaeser (2004), find a negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and redistribution. Like the logic of liberal nationalism (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995), they argue that individuals tend to care more about in-group members of their own racial or ethnic groups than out-group members by increasing interpersonal trust and a sense of connectedness. Others focus on the relationship between national identity and redistributive preferences. For example, Shayo (2009) argues that strong national identification tends to reduce demands for redistribution. By assuming a trade-off relationship between class and national identities, he demonstrates that as economic inequality increases, poor voters are more likely to strengthen their national identity (higher-status group) instead of class identity (lower-status group) and, thus, reduce support for redistribution.

Although the existing theories explain some regions of the world, they cannot provide appropriate explanation on other regions: the third-wave democracies. For instance, in contrast to the identity-based explanation (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, though see Steele 2016), some countries with high levels of ethnic homogeneity and strong national identification, such as South Korea, sustain small welfare states. Moreover, Shayo (2009) also admits that while his theoretical expectation appears in the advanced democracies, it is not observed outside the industrial world. Their limitations may come from the fact that they view nationalism as an “empty” social categorization that simply defines in-group and out-group members. Instead, I

argue that nationalism contains a set of norms, especially in the third-wave democracies that faced twin challenges of nation-building and modernization. In other words, not all nationalism created same. Before discussing what and how norms are embedded in nationalism, I first introduce my approach to nationalism as group norms.

Nationalism as Group Norms

To explain public opinion on redistribution in the third-wave democracies, I offer a novel theoretical framework for how nationalist legacies from the past authoritarian regimes shape public beliefs about redistribution. My core argument is that nationalism formed under authoritarian developing countries, especially those that faced intertwined challenges of nation-building and modernization, tends to implant pro-development *norms*. As the norms percolate to and are grounded among citizens through the nationalism, citizens likely establish developmentalist attitudes while regarding demand for redistribution as a betrayal of the nation.

As Abdelal et al. (2009) defines, a collective identity consists of two dimensions: content and contestation. This suggests that nationalism – as a social identity – has not only its meanings (content) but also the degree of agreement over the meanings among its members (contestation). To discuss the mechanism through which the pro-development norms formed under authoritarianism shape individuals' preferences for redistribution, I focus on constitutive norms among the four types of the content.² Constitutive norms refer to “formal and informal

² According to Abdelal et al. (2009), the content of social identities takes the form of four, but not mutually exclusive, types: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models. Though I focus on constitutive norms, the other types also play important roles in embedding the pro-development norms in nationalism. First, because social purposes refer to “the goals that are shared by members of a group” (Abdelal et al. 2009, 19), governmental mobilization for national development may provide social pressure to set the goal of industrialization as a social purpose. Second, cognitive models refer to “the worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests” (Abdelal et al. 2009, 19). Thus, governmental strategies to internalize and indoctrinate key ideologies for national industrialization may shape a particular cognitive model.

rules that define group membership” (Abdelal et al. 2009, 19). In other words, the norms serve as an injunctive guidance for how group members should think and behave, beyond simply differentiating in-group and out-group members. In my theory, people with stronger national identification are therefore more likely to establish the pro-development norms, which in turn shape their political attitudes and behavior.

My approach to nationalism as norms provides a new perspective to help us understand the way that nationalism shapes economic attitudes, including preferences for redistribution. As noted earlier, the limitations of the existing identity-based theories force us to rethink about the role of national identification in terms of redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Shayo 2009; Steele 2016). However, a research tradition based on group norms helps to complement the limitations. For example, Jetten, Postmes, and McAuliffe (2002) find that in the U.S. (an individualist culture), those who strongly identify with their nation are more individualist than weak identifiers. Conversely, in Indonesia (a collectivist culture), strong identifiers are more collectivist than weak identifiers. This suggests that high levels of national identification do not necessarily lead to a same outcome but, instead, it depends on what norms and cultures nationalism contains. In a similar vein, although the conventional wisdom about the role of nationalism in international politics relies on the logic simply separating “us” from “them” (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti 2009; Mutz and Kim 2017), Powers (2022) differentiates between unity and equality as separate foundational norms of nationalisms – instead of the one-

Lastly, relational comparisons refer to “defining an identity group by what it is not – that is, the way it views other identity groups” (Abdelal et al. 2009, 19). Once the pro-development nationalism is established, members may easily recognize its related norms as a defining characteristic of their national identity to differentiate in-group and out-group and, thus, shape the way that they view the latter (i.e., they may view those who demand welfare policies as betrayers of the nation).

dimensional nationalism – to explain support for conflict or cooperation. In short, content matters.

In this study, I delve into norms of nationalism. My theory posits that the content of nationalism varies depending on historical trajectories. Thus, the inconsistencies in empirical findings of the identity-based theories can arise because high levels of national identification do not necessarily result in a same outcome due to different contents. Following this logic, I argue that in new democracies that experienced state-led economic development in the process of nation-building, nationalism is imbued with pro-development norms, thereby reducing preferences for redistribution by regarding it as a betrayal of the nation. My argument is in line with a literature that views social identification as an affective process, beyond cognitive process. National identification not only instills intrinsic obligation, mutual commitment, and psychological devotion based on relational perception (Hur 2022; Singh 2015; Wong 2010), but also shapes collective memory and belief based on contextual perception (Jo 2022). And, in my theory, it creates and establishes norms (e.g., Anoll 2018). Furthermore, my argument is also consistent with another literature that explains that those ideas and beliefs shape political attitudes and behavior (Wang, Platow, and Newman 2022). For instance, Walsh (2012) finds that rural residents favor limited government, which is contradictory to their self-interests. Also, despite increase in income inequality and decrease in economic mobility, many Americans still believe in the prospect of upward mobility (Kim 2022). Likewise, in my theory, those with higher levels of national identification have weaker preferences for redistribution based on the pro-development norms even if it contradicts their self-interests.

Nationalism and Pro-Development Norms in New Democracies

When confronted with simultaneous challenges of nation-building and modernization,

authoritarian leaders have strong incentives to utilize nationalist ideologies to homogenize and mobilize the population for economic development (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). As Smith (2001) suggests, political stories that form political peoplehood are not natural or primordial, but human creations. Given that ‘the politics of people-building’ is a result of asymmetrical interactions between constituents and leaders who “articulate and seek to institutionalize conceptions of political peoplehood” (75), nationalism in new democracies not only serve as a mobilizing strategy for industrialization, but also play an important role in nation-building and people-building. In contrast, because modernization and nation-building did not necessarily occur simultaneously in the advanced democracies (Weber 1976; Wimmer 2018), economic identity and national identity can conflict each other in some cases as Shayo (2009) demonstrates. Hence, I expect that nationalism and its contents are more likely to be connected closely to economic attitudes in the third-wave democracies than in advanced democracies.

As discussed earlier, I argue that nationalism is likely to be grounded as norms, beyond a mere social categorization that divides in-group and out-group members (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Anoll 2018; Malešević 2019). The literature on authoritarian ruling strategies suggests that the regime tries to internalize and indoctrinate key ideologies, norms, and values for legitimation (Geddes and Zaller 1989; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011; Treisman 2011; Huang 2018), and nationalism is one way to do so (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017). Just like the political socialization process in democracies (Jennings 1984), the authoritarian attitudinal effects can lead to political socialization and even establish norms via the political regime at the macro-level (Malešević 2019). In addition, socialization agents at different levels, such as political and societal organizations at the meso-level and family and

peers at the micro-level (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020), play important roles in deepening the norms via micro-interactional dynamics of nationalism. For example, the public educational system and mass media can transmit the nationalist ideologies and developmentalist norms via well-designed curriculum, textbooks, and the limited media environment (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Darden and Mylonas 2016; Cantoni et al. 2017). As a result, having pro-development norms is considered patriotism, whereas those against economic development such as demanding more redistribution can be regarded as a betrayal of the nation.

In particular, because those directly exposed to the educational system are children and young people who can easily internalize the norms in accordance with the governmental political intentions during their formative years (Gellner 1983; Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Krishnarajan, Doucette, and Andersen 2022), the pro-development nationalism as norms can spread more widely and effectively and, thus, last long even after democratization. Though it may be possible that meso- and micro-level socialization agents such as church, family, and peers can dampen the national socialization in line with the official line of the regime (Müller and Neundorf 2012), those agents can conversely strengthen the regime's efforts especially when the state leads successful economic development by penetrating deep into its society including the meso- and micro-level agents (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020).

More importantly, the pro-development norms obtained via authoritarian national socialization can play a central role in establishing personal rules by which individuals define what is right or wrong in their daily lives (Anoll 2018). Social psychologists explain that the external social norms tend to become internalized and embedded as personal norms that shape attitudes and behaviors (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Tankard and Paluck 2016; Wang, Platow, and Newman 2022). Given that authoritarian leaders utilize nationalism to homogenize the

population and mobilize for national economic development, their efforts to indoctrinate and internalize the pro-development norms can be effectively grounded as personal norms under the controlled society because norms can be further strengthened by interactions among group members (Gerber and Rogers 2009; McClendon 2014). As Malešević (2019, 3) writes, nationalism is “a very rich and diverse set of ideas, principles and practices” that are fundamental to everyday life. Hence, nationalism as personal norms can “be thought of as a cognitive panopticon, a constant monitoring system based in the principles of the outside world” (Anoll 2018, 495). As they perceive that economic development is good, valuable, and even right, those with high levels of nationalism are likely to regard any attitudes and behavior against the pro-development norms, including demanding more redistribution, as a betrayal of the nation and even something morally wrong. Based on the discussions above, I generate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Those with higher levels of national identification are less likely to prefer redistribution.

I argue that nationalism formed during the past authoritarian regime serves as personal norms as well as social norms to support economic development and, at the same time, oppose any actions against it, such as demanding welfare policies. As noted earlier, because the pro-development nationalism is likely to be obtained via diverse socialization agents of the authoritarianism, its influence on redistributive preferences can vary according to the degree to which individuals had experienced the past regime. Hence, I expect that *generation* should have conditional effects on the relationship. In other words, because the negative relationship between nationalism and demands for redistribution comes from nationalist legacies of authoritarian regimes, I predict that the pattern will appear more robust among older cohorts,

who directly experienced the past regime and thus firmly established the pro-development norms via national socialization process. Therefore, I formulate the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): The negative relationship between national identification and preferences for redistribution will appear more robust among older cohorts who experienced political socialization under the past developmental state.

Formation of Pro-Development Nationalism in South Korea

To demonstrate my argument, I use the case of South Korea because it offers theoretically appropriate settings to examine the relationship between nationalism and attitudes toward redistribution in new democracies. South Korea experienced one of the most dynamic developmental states, during which its leader, the president Park Chung Hee, took advantage of nationalism to mobilize the public and push the entire society for industrialization. As a result, most citizens formed nationalism during the period, thereby establishing pro-development norms by regarding them as patriotism.

In a comparative perspective, South Korea, especially under Park, is considered an economically successful developing country. Kohli (2004), who suggests three models of developing states, explains that South Korea is a typical case of ‘cohesive-capitalist states,’ which have centralized and purposive authority structures to achieve rapid and successful national economic growth. Though the state and its citizens suffered from a destroyed economy and severe poverty in their everyday lives in the 1950s after the Korean War (1950-1953), it industrialized rapidly and successfully via labor-intensive and light consumer goods in the 1960s and heavy industries such as steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, and electronics in the 1970s. The official economic records from the Bank of Korea indicate that the industrialization strategies during the Park’s developmental state produced, on average, 9% annual growth in

the overall economy and even 15% annual growth rate particularly in manufacturing industries.

During the industrializing period, Park strategically utilized nationalism for both economic development and new nation-building by proclaiming that nationalism is a core ideological construct in the presidential speeches (Kim 2013). To do this, he penetrated deep into the civil society by mobilizing and controlling each sector in the society. In particular, he tried to embed strong nationalism especially in schools, farm villages in rural areas, and private businesses in urban areas to form a developmentalist coalition while excluding labor unions,³ opposition politicians, and dissident intelligentsia.⁴ In short, the national ideologies were “very effective in expediting the process of industrialization” under Park (Moon and Jun 2011, 128).

In this study, I focus on two programs, which are used to widely spread the nationalist ideologies, among others: the “Charter of National Education” (CNE hereafter) and “New Village Movement” (*Saemaul Undong*, NVM hereafter). First, Park issued the CNE in 1968 by emphasizing nationalism to industrialize and revitalize the nation (see Appendix 1). He strongly believed that its citizens should weed out the old-fashioned Confucian tradition rooted primarily in the parent-child relationship, but instead desired to newly form the national consciousness by extending the relationship to the state, which is a larger and higher

³ The economic growth under Park can be attributed in part to tight control on labor especially through the Special Law Concerning National Security, which was enacted in 1971 and precluded collective bargaining and collective action. Furthermore, the Chun Doo Hwan government (1980-1987), who occupied the presidency after the assassination of Park in 1979, even banned industry-level unionization and instead partially allowed only company-level union activities through the Trade Union Law in 1981 (Yang 2017).

⁴ This is exactly consistent with the existing explanation that authoritarian regimes have “different effects on different individuals as a function of the context in which these individuals experience the authoritarian regime” (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020), because the regime tends to adopt heterogeneous ruling strategies for each group in a society (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020; Neundorf, Gerschewski, and Olar 2020). This strongly suggests that South Korea – as a positive case – shows in-depth mechanisms of my theoretical argument in a comparative perspective.

community than a family, for the state-defined goal of economic development and prosperity.⁵ Thus, as shown in Appendix 1, Park stressed nationalist ethos by stating that “we were born into this land charged with the historic mission to revitalize the nation” at the beginning of the CNE, and implanted three core values based on nationalism in it: ‘the establishment of self-reliant nationalism,’ ‘the creation of a new national culture with harmonization of tradition and progress,’ and ‘the development of democracy with harmonization of the state and individuals.’ Since the CNE was printed on the first page of all school textbooks and used as a guidance for education at all levels, the regime could easily and successfully lead young students to internalize the nationalist ideologies as social norms for single-mindedly pursuing economic development (Moon and Jun 2011).⁶


Second, the Park regime also launched the NVM, a nationwide self-help program, in 1970 to mobilize farmers in rural areas via the grassroots propaganda (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 1980; Hong, Park, and Yang 2022). As a result, pro-development norms percolated to the broader population through the nationalism. By distributing transistor radios and loudspeakers for free and disseminating a theme song of the NVM as well as Park’s speeches, he emphasized ‘diligence,’ ‘self-help,’ and ‘cooperation’ in the NVM (see Figure 1). It outwardly intended to reform and improve the rural communities, which were losing its comparative advantage due to the governmental industrial strategies (Lee 2011; Yang 2017). However, its implicit goal was to raise the nationalism that contains values of diligence, self-help, and collaboration among

⁵ Indeed, he claimed that the “tradition of loyalty and filial piety is rooted in love of, and dedication to, the community to which one belongs. The state is a larger community, and the family is a smaller community of people’s life. Thus, love toward the two communities is identical in substance.” (Park 1978, 22).

⁶ As evidenced by interview analysis below, South Koreans who experienced the Park era as students commonly testified that schoolteachers enforced them to memorize the CNE line by line. Otherwise, they got punished and/or could not go home.

the citizens for the top-down economic development (Park 1979). Because social norms can be transmitted via human interactions and mechanisms of social rewards and sanctions (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Tankard and Paluck 2016), the way that Park's regime operated the NVM was very efficient and successful at establishing the nationalism as social norms as well as personal norms.⁷

Figure 1 The Aspirations of New Village Movement: Handwritten Memo by Park



Notes: Park Chung Hee Presidential Museum, Seoul (photo taken by the author)

Moreover, the NVM was gradually expanded to factories and workplaces of diverse industries in urban areas as well and, thus, became a truly nationwide modernization movement. As it spread beyond the rural villages, it not only cultivated entrepreneurial spirit but also urged

⁷ Specifically, the government conditionally provided rural villages with financial and material resources for production of public goods (i.e., cash transfer, cement, fertilizer, grain subsidies) based on competitive and strict performance criteria, rather than egalitarian criteria. Given the merit-based system, villagers voluntarily worked hard together to obtain a larger share of the governmental resources than their competitor villages in the following year. More importantly, they did so by believing that their hard work was not only for their villages but also for the nation. Thus, the mechanisms of social rewards and sanctions among the villagers helped the nationalist norms spread more widely, deeply, and effectively.

those in mass rallies and in the workplace to sacrifice themselves and maximize production for the sake of national development. By allocating resources and credit and giving a variety of policy incentives to the key business groups, Park “constantly invoked nationalist ideology and organized mass organizations” (Moon and Jun 2011, 128). In addition, through state’s regular scrutinization, firms that failed at exports were likely to go bankrupt as punishment whereas those succeeded could not only enjoy public and governmental supports but also were “treated as national heroes” especially on a national export day (Kohli 2004, 121). As a result, the spirit of developmentalist nationalism embedded in the NVM played an important role as the driving force that fueled so called ‘the miracle of Han River.’ More crucially, both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations embedded in the CNE and NVM among others allowed the public to construct the pro-development nationalism as social norms and even feel such as something natural in their everyday lives (Billig 1995). Therefore, daily exposure to those norms resulted in personal norms to powerfully shape political attitudes including redistribution preferences even after democratization, believing it as patriotism.

Empirical Approach: A Mixed-Method

My key claim is that those with higher levels of national identification are more likely to have pro-development norms and, thus, exhibit weaker preferences for redistribution. For empirical analysis, I adopt a mixed-method approach: a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses in the context of South Korea. I first conduct in-depth interview analysis and then provide further evidence using a nationally representative survey.

I expect that the mixed-method approach strengthens both internal and external validity of my analysis. First, because pro-development norms play a pivotal role in my theory, it is very essential to identify the mechanisms by which people establish the norms and, in turn,

shape their perceptions of redistribution. Narrative is one of the most effective ways to do this because it shows “a sense of speakers’ cognitive maps of themselves, both in relation to others and in the specific contexts of their described behavior” (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316). In other words, narrative provides explanations not only on historical and contextual stories about how speakers have lived so far, but also on causal stories about why they think and behave in a particular way. Second, after identifying the mechanisms through narratives, it is important to generalize the patterns beyond my interview subjects. Thus, I use a nationally representative survey. In short, because the two methods stand on different methodological rationales, I expect the strengths of each method to compensate for weaknesses of the other.

In-depth Interview Analysis

Methods

Given that the pivotal lever in my theory is *the experience of the past authoritarian regime*, I chose two generations as my interviewees that have very contrasting trajectories of formation of nationalism: the generations born in (1) between 1947 and 1965 and (2) between 1982 and 1997.⁸ Because personal narratives contain perceptions of political reality that shape political behavior, I expect the stories of my interviewees to provide rich information not only on how they have established their nationalism, but also on how they connect it to their attitudes toward redistribution.

⁸ Strictly speaking, the criterion of age that I used to recruit my interviewees – especially, the older cohort – is slightly different from that of my survey analysis below. This mismatch stems from my decision to maximize the sample size of interview given the constraints of my budget and time. However, the exclusion of interviewees whose birthyears do not match the criterion in the survey analysis produces the same findings reported in the manuscript.

Because one of the strongest explanations on redistribution relies on the economic logic of self-interests (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Cansunar 2021), I additionally considered economic heterogeneity (i.e., upper versus lower class) within each cohort. To do this, I used income and assets as well as subjective class perception and current and former occupational types for the older cohort.⁹ But for the younger cohort, I only considered subjective class perception.¹⁰ Through a private survey company in South Korea in the spring of 2022,¹¹ I obtained sixty interviewees in total: (1) upper class born in between 1947 and 1965 (Group 1, N=20); (2) lower class born in between 1947 and 1965 (Group 2, N=20); (3) upper class born in between 1982 and 1997 (Group 3, N=9); and (4) lower class born in between 1982 and 1997 (Group 4; N=11).¹²

Concerned with the possibility that the subjects may not want to deliver their true stories and honest opinions especially on their personal economic situations and preferences for redistribution, I conducted one-to-one and face-to-face interviews in a private meeting room of the survey company after obtaining a signed consent form for participation and recording.¹³

⁹ Because many of the older cohort have already retired, it may not be reasonable to simply differentiate the economic status using their income levels. I thus recruited interviewees of the older cohort based on the four variables.

¹⁰ It can be also inappropriate to decide the economic status of the younger cohort by just using their income levels because many of them are still seeking jobs. I thus believe subjective class perception is a better predictor than income, asset, and occupational type.

¹¹ Because I conducted the interviews between February and April of 2022, interviewees were highly aware of welfare issues in the 20th presidential election which was held on March 9, 2022. Though I did not directly ask their partisanship and/or vote intention, I could recognize their partisan preferences during the interview. However, *regardless of partisanship*, nationalism and economic self-interest were key factors that shape attitudes toward redistribution among the older and younger cohorts, respectively.

¹² The total sixty sample included twenty-three women (38.3%) and thirty-seven men (61.7%). All of them were living in Seoul and satellite cities in the Gyeonggi province although their hometown regions were diverse.

¹³ Before beginning the interviews, I introduced myself, let them know the interview research was approved by my institution's IRB, and visited my academic website with them so that they can get to know who I am and what

All participants received about 50 USD (70,000 won) for their time, and the interviews took between forty minutes to two and a half hours. I first explained that the general topic of interview was national pride and welfare attitudes and began by asking, “Are you proud of your nation, South Korea?” Then, I continued to ask their opinion on the four subtopics as shown in my interview protocol (Appendix 2): (1) the economic development under Park; (2) the current economic situation in South Korea; (3) welfare policies; and (4) the relationship between welfare and economic growth.

After completing the interviews, I collected transcripts and read them through repeatedly to find patterns across the different groups. Based on my interview protocol, I focused on how they formed nationalism and described it, and how they related it to economic attitudes including inequality perception, preferences for redistribution, and the relationship between economic growth and redistribution. To do this, I organized the data in a matrix where the rows indicated each group and interviewee, and the columns represented each of the contents that I were to analyze.

Main Pattern

Consistent with my theoretical argument, nationalism formed during the developmental state strongly shapes weaker preferences for redistribution. As Table 1 shows, subjects in the older cohort (Group 1 and 2) – *regardless of their economic status* – tend to negatively connect national sentiments to their attitudes toward redistribution. This suggests that, though economic self-interests still matter, the pro-development nationalism is the primary driver in terms of

I am studying. I then promised to keep the interviews confidential and asked them to contact me whenever they have any questions even after the interviews.


their redistributive preferences. Among the older groups, those with higher levels of national pride tend to prioritize the nation over individuals and thus show weaker redistributive preferences, believing that demanding more redistribution is a betrayal of the nation and even an evil that can harm the national economy of which they are proud. In particular, they emphasize the norms of diligence, thrift and saving, and sacrifice and collaboration for the nation to oppose redistribution. In other words, those norms made them strongly believe that individuals, not the government, are responsible for poverty and redistribution. In sharp contrast, those in the younger cohorts (Group 3 and 4) do not relate nationalism to their attitudes toward redistribution even though many of them are also proud of national development under Park. Instead, their economic self-interests powerfully shape their redistributive preferences.

Table 1 Relationship between Nationalism and Redistribution Preferences by Political Cohort

		Political cohort	
		Older	Younger
Economic status	Upper	Group 1: Negative (-)	Group 3: Null
	Lower	Group 2: Negative (-)	Group 4: Null

Given the main pattern in Table 1, my interview analysis below consists of two parts, focusing on the older cohort. Figure 2 depicts its theoretical framework. The first part will explain how the nationalism was imbued with pro-development social norms during Park’s development state and grounded as personal norms that guide what is right and wrong – especially for the nation and economic development. The second part will show which contents and meanings are contained in the nationalism and, accordingly, how they shape attitudes toward redistribution.

Figure 2 Pro-Development Nationalism and Redistribution Preferences among the older cohort



Part 1: National Socialization under Park

As a result of national socialization under Park, many of my interviewees from the older cohort (Group 1 and 2) connected their nationalism to economic development under Park and his efforts, which suggests that they formed nationalism during his era. As shown in Table 2, their narratives indicated that two factors played a central role in shaping the pro-development nationalism: governmental programs such as the CNE and NVM; and direct experience of economic success. Interestingly, however, the mechanisms were different such that the former externally indoctrinated it, while the latter provided them with opportunities to voluntarily strengthen their confidence in it.

Table 2 National Socialization under Park

National socialization	Excerpt from interviews
Governmental programs: the CNE and NVM	<p>“Park created the CNE for students and made them memorize it in order to raise a patriotic view of nation. I believe that the CNE (...) successfully shaped students’ patriotism and thus contributed to the rapid national economic development” (female, 1949, Group 1).</p> <p>“The biggest thing is the NVM, which enlightened the public. (...) The most important factor for the successful economic development was the diligence of our people, and I think that President Park Chung Hee successfully led the NVM that raised the value of diligence and took advantage of it for economic development. (...) I believe that it also raised the collaborative attitudes” (male, 1957, Group 2).</p> <p>“During the NVM period, there was a trend of working hard together, so everyone worked hard until late at night. The overall atmosphere was like that at that time. Even on holidays, we worked. (...) That inspired patriotism. But not voluntarily. I just accepted because it was political. The school pushed me to feel that way, especially because I was young. Because of the overall</p>

	atmosphere, everyone thought ‘it is what it is’ at that time” (male, 1958, Group 2).
Experience of economic success	<p>“Working was life. I feel proud because we worked so hard and achieved today’s Korea. And those who worked hard at that time also achieved personal success now. At that time, President Park was in power. (...)” (female, 1954, Group 2).</p> <p>“[Through the national economic success] I perceived that my living was getting better as well. I could expect that I would live better, and that the country would also live better together. (...) I experienced economic achievements such as increased income and, as a result, my conviction that I had to work hard became even stronger” (male, 1952, Group 1).</p>

First, the CNE and NVM were compulsory but successful means by which the government internalized and indoctrinated pro-development nationalist ideologies. Many of the older cohort commonly stated that they experienced the two programs and, thus, raised patriotism. Given that everyone at the time should follow the rules of the programs, they accepted the related values as social norms because most around them thought and behaved the way they did. For example, since they must memorize every line of the CNE in school to avoid physical punishment and go home, most of them can still recite it. Despite its coercion, consistent with multiple subjects, a female (1949, Group 1) asserted that “the CNE, along with raising and saluting the national flag and playing the national anthem at 5pm every day, successfully shaped students’ patriotism and thus contributed to the rapid national economic development.” Likewise, they also described the NVM as a movement that successfully enlightened the public about the values of diligence and collaboration for the economic success. Another subject (male, 1957, Group 2) stated: “The biggest thing is the NVM, which enlightened the public. When I was a student, I participated a lot in the NVM. I believe we, the people, were enlightened at that time. The most important factor for the successful economic development was the diligence of our people, and I think President Park Chung Hee

successfully led the NVM that raised the value of diligence and took advantage of it for economic development. ... It also raised the collaborative attitudes.”

More importantly, through the experience of those programs, individuals formed national sentiments in tandem with the national development so that they can still relate nationalism to economic growth: “During that time, I heard the theme song of the NVM at home every morning. ... When the song resounded through the speaker in the whole village, I somehow felt alive. The song was a song of hope. It was lively. I was around 20, and felt motivated to work, I felt like I also had to work hard for national development, my spirit felt clearer, and I felt like I was getting stronger. ... I think there’s something that boosted patriotism. ... And everyone started working that way” (female, 1954, Group 2). As most of the people at that time followed and shared the way of living and thinking, it became social norms that are considered natural, good, and right for the nation. A male subject states (1958, Group 2): “During the NVM period, there was a trend of working hard together, so everyone worked hard until late at night. The overall atmosphere was like that at that time. Even on holidays, we worked. There was no rest at all on Saturdays like now. ... We tried to live well following the government policy. So, we worked hard together. ... Because of the overall atmosphere, everyone thought ‘it is what it is’ at that time.”

Second, though they formed their pro-development nationalism via the compulsory governmental programs, it became grounded as personal norms since they directly experienced both national and personal economic success. That is, the more they experienced economic growth, the more convinced they were that the meanings and contents of the pro-development nationalism were good, valuable, and right (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Tankard and Paluck 2016). In other words, they voluntarily strengthened the developmentalist norms. A female subject

(1954, Group 2) asserted that working attitudes formed under Park resulted in not only national economic success but also personal economic success: “Working was life. I feel proud because we worked so hard and achieved today’s Korea. And those who worked hard at that time also achieved personal success now. At that time, President Park was in power. At that time, the President and everyone said that we must work hard and diligently and must do our best.” With the experience of both national and personal economic success, they became more and more confident in the pro-development nationalism and thus grounded it as personal norms: “[Through the national economic success] I perceived that my living was getting better as well. I could expect that I would live better, and that the country would also live better together. At that time, because villagers thought that they must go to work when everyone in the country were told to do so, we worked a lot. Through it, I experienced economic achievements such as increased income and, as a result, my conviction that I had to work hard became even stronger” (male, 1952, Group 1).

Part 2: Internalization of Pro-Development Norms

The above part demonstrates that those who experienced political socialization under Park strongly formed pro-development nationalism both *externally* via governmental programs such as the CNE and NVM and *internally* via experience of national and personal economic success. Then, which norms of the nationalism lead to weaker preferences for redistribution? In other words, what contents and meanings the pro-development nationalism contains? My interview data suggest that three norms are firmly established in the nationalism. Table 3 shows that diligence, thrift and saving, and sacrifice and collaboration for the nation are the core norms embedded in the nationalism that shape attitudes toward redistribution.

Table 3 Internalization of Pro-Development Norms and Attitudes toward Redistribution

Pro-development norm	Excerpt from interviews
Diligence	<p>“When our nation is prosperous, families automatically prosper. At that time, everyone around me thought like that and we thus worked hard for the nation” (female, 1954, Group 2).</p> <p>“[People] have misunderstanding of welfare. (...) Welfare means helping poor people? No, I strongly oppose it. Welfare is to make those people work hard so that they can become normal people” (male, 1961, Group 1).</p>
Thrift and saving	<p>“We saved a lot because electricity and water were imported. After washing clothes, we reused the water in the bathroom. (...) We learned that we must save to export as much as we imported and used. So, we also saved even toilet paper because everything was imported. (...) Because we followed that way of living when we were young, Korea is what it is today” (female, 1954, Group 2).</p> <p>“Their [welfare recipients’] lives were messy and extravagant. Now, the country is giving them welfare. But my mom saved money a lot all her life. Because she is rich now, the country does not give welfare benefits to her while caring for them” (female, 1962, Group 1).</p>
Sacrifice and collaboration	<p>“I think young people now don’t have such patriotism to sacrifice for the nation. That’s why they desire welfare. That’s the exact reason. They never think about the whole country, but they only think about themselves, individuals” (male, 1957, Group 2).</p> <p>“I think it is better to develop national economy rather than individual lives [through welfare policies]. Our country has limitations. It’s a small country. ... Even if I eat less and spend less, our country should not go just for a day or two and stop. For our nation and our future generations to move forward firmly, I can make sacrifices again and I think the nation should do those policies [for economic development]” (female, 1960, Group 2).</p>

First, the older cohort strongly emphasizes the value of *diligence* as a nationalist legacy of Park’s era. For them, being a patriot means working hard for the nation and they also believe that it can eventually facilitate the prosperity of families and individuals as well: “When our nation is prosperous, families automatically prosper. At that time, everyone around me thought like that and we thus worked hard for the nation” (female, 1954, Group 2). In particular, most of the older cohort exemplified the historical stories of South Korean miners and nurses sent to

Germany to work and earn foreign currency as an industrializing strategy under Park: “The President Park went to Germany to meet the miners and nurses even though we did not have our national airplane. We cried a lot when we saw that. How miserable the president was? In Germany, the president cried with the miners and nurses who worked hard there. And in Korea, we watched it on TV and cried together. At that time, the money that the miners and nurses earned was a huge boost to the national economy. They sent the money back to Korea, and we used it and invested it for national economic development. It was such a big foundation” (male, 1947, Group 2). Such comments clearly demonstrate that the value of diligence is one key aspect of the pro-development nationalism.

More crucially, it decreases their support for redistribution. Because the older cohort believe poverty is a result of the lack of diligence, they think that redistribution is the demand of lazy people unless disabled. Due to those beliefs, they view welfare as harmful to the national economy and even detrimental to the value of diligence from Park’s era. They asserted that Park’s developmental strategies are the true meaning of welfare: “[People] have misunderstanding of welfare. ... Welfare means helping poor people? No, I strongly oppose it. Welfare is to make those people work hard so that they can become normal people. So, I believe our country’s welfare is to create an environment where people can work hard just like President Park Chung Hee did” (male, 1961, Group 1). In a similar vein, another subject (male, 1961, Group 1) said: “I think we need economic growth policies rather than welfare policies. ... The nation is more important than individuals. Individuals should work hard to contribute to the nation. ... [Welfare] makes people lazy. If there are many [lazy] people like that, the national development will subside.” Those comments suggest that because working hard, based on the experience of Park’s era, is considered not only normal but also normatively and morally

right, it attributes poverty to individual fault. Hence, the older cohort with the pro-development nationalism tend to support governmental policies to make people work harder, not welfare policies.

Second, those who experienced Park's regime also stress the values of *thrift and saving*. They connect these norms to national economy and, again, shape their attitudes toward redistribution. Specifically, they believe that people need to save resources because South Korea's national economy relies on export-led strategies. Given that Park's regime established those strategies and emphasized the use of domestic products, instead of imported ones, for rapid and successful industrialization, the process of political socialization during his era led the older cohort to internalize the values of thrift and saving even as their personal norms. Many of them commonly cherish the norms as another aspect of the pro-development nationalism to become a patriot: "We saved a lot because electricity and water were imported. After washing clothes, we reused the water in the bathroom. ... We learned that we must save to export as much as we imported and used. So, we also saved even toilet paper because everything was imported. ... Because we followed that way of living when we were young, Korea is what it is today. And I think I am also living well now because of that kind of mindset toward the nation" (female, 1954, Group 2).

And the logic under this perception is extended to shape a negative view on welfare beneficiaries and redistribution. For example, those who emphasize thrift and saving tend to regard welfare recipients as extravagant: "Living together in a town for 50-60 years, we know that they [who now receive welfare benefits] wasted money to drink, gamble, and meet women when they were young. Their lives were messy and extravagant. Now, the country is giving them welfare. But my mom saved money a lot all her life. Because she is rich now, the country

does not give welfare benefits to her while caring for them” (female, 1962, Group 1). In addition, because the norms of thrift and saving are not limited to personal money but extended to national money, many of the older cohort think that, even though a minimum level of welfare is necessary, it can waste the national coffers and worry that it harms national economic growth by viewing the two as a trade-off relationship. A male subject (1965, Group 2) said: “Southern European and Latin American countries failed due to excessive welfare. It will not take a long time for us to follow them if we waste the national money on welfare.” Similarly, another subject (female, 1954, Group 1) stated: “Welfare policy can be necessary, but there is too much money leaking. ... [Politicians] never say where the money for welfare comes from. Where does the money come from? We must go our own way. We must export more. Those who export are patriots. To export, we need to invest in economic growth policies, not welfare policies.” Such comments show that the norms of thrift and saving were established by the export-oriented industrializing strategies under Park’s regime, and that they play an important role in connecting nationalism to welfare attitudes. Because people apply those norms not only to personal resources but also to national resources, they view redistribution as something against the norms. As a result, they exhibit weaker preferences for generous welfare.

Lastly, the norms of *sacrifice and collaboration* for the nation are firmly embedded in the pro-development nationalism. Since many of the older cohort established the value of sacrifice for the nation under Park, they still believe that the people should devote themselves to the nation. A female subject (1949, Group 1) said: “At that time, loyalty to the country and loyalty to the president were even more important. And at that time, we were less self-interested, but more sacrificed for and more dedicated to our nation. President Park did like that. [He was] very strong, had a strong patriotism, and was not greedy for personal and family benefits. ...

There was the NVM. Thanks to it, I think the people made a lot of sacrifices for the nation. It was possible because schools taught it. But now schools do not. If we don't provide students with that kind of education, that kind of patriotism cannot arise." And for them, the value of sacrifice is naturally connected to the collaborative spirit such that individuals should sacrifice and work hard together for the nation and national development: "We, the people, had a strong desire to work hard together for the nation. And we expect that the nation would become prosperous and, as a result, that my children and future generations would be able to live well" (male, 1958, Group 1).

The norms of sacrifice and collaborative spirit also reduce their preferences for redistribution. There are two distinct, but related, underlying logics. Some explained that demanding more redistribution, especially among younger citizens, comes from the lack of patriotism of sacrifice: "I think young people now don't have such patriotism to sacrifice for the nation. That's why they desire welfare. That's the exact reason. They never think about the whole country, but they only think about themselves, individuals" (male, 1957, Group 2). Relatedly, others prioritized policies for national economic growth over welfare policies by emphasizing that they are, again, willing to sacrifice themselves for the nation and their offspring: "I think it is better to develop national economy rather than individual lives [through welfare policies]. Our country has limitations. It's a small country. ... Even if I eat less and spend less, our country should not go just for a day or two and stop. For our nation and our future generations to move forward firmly, I can make sacrifices again and I think the nation should do those policies [for economic development]" (female, 1960, Group 2). Such comments suggest that those who experienced Park's regime strongly established the norms of sacrifice and collaboration for the nation and its economic development in their national

sentiments. As a result, they believe that the expansion of welfare is at odds with those norms.

Older versus Younger Cohort

To further clarify the nature of the pro-development nationalism from Park's developmental state, I additionally present conversations of the younger cohort. As explained so far, the older cohort formed their nationalism based on the experience of Park's era and equated it with pro-development and weaker support for redistribution. Many interviewees in the younger cohort were also proud of the rapid and successful national economic development under Park. However, these national sentiments among the younger cohort were not connected to their economic preferences. Instead, their economic self-interests were the key factor that shapes their redistributive preferences. Even if they exhibit preferences for redistribution against their economic positions (i.e., high demands for redistribution despite upper economic status), it comes from the economic rationale, not the nationalism.

When I began the interviews by asking their opinion on the economic development under Park following my interview protocol, many of both older and younger groups answered that they were very proud of the national economic achievement under Park and believed that he made the foundation for the current economy of South Korea. However, despite the high levels of pride in national economy, the way that they viewed it was sharply contrasting. As described above, the older cohort perceived the national economic achievement as their own and internalized the pro-development norms based on their nationalism. Conversely, the younger cohort differentiated the nation and individuals and complained that the economically wealthy country did nothing for them. One young woman said that: "National economic growth has increased a lot. But I have seen many friends criticizing the country because of what 'I' have received from the country. Nothing" (1997, Group 3). As a result, though the different

cohorts were commonly proud of the history of rapid and successful economic development under Park, the way that nationalism shapes attitudes toward redistribution was very different between the older cohort and the younger cohort.

The younger cohort shaped their attitudes toward redistribution in accordance with their own economic status, not nationalism, by differentiating between the nation and individuals. Thus, as the economic theory on redistribution predicts (Meltzer and Richard 1981), those who self-identified with upper class tend to oppose redistribution while those who self-identified with lower class show stronger redistribution preferences. Interestingly, there were some cases where subjects exhibited economic preferences in contrast to their economic status. Yet, the subjects again provided economic reasons. For example, some of the younger cohort who preferred pro-development policies to welfare policies, despite the lower economic status, explained that economic growth policies, not welfare policies, would create more jobs and help them to find well-paid jobs: “So, frankly speaking, I’m more favor of economic growth policies because we [the younger cohort] have to get jobs. ... We think our own well-being is more important [than the national economy]. No matter what the country is, I think it’s more important for me to make a living” (male, 1993, Group 4). Similarly, others who demanded more welfare, despite the upper economic status, said that: “I also pay taxes, but I sometimes wonder why I don’t get welfare benefits. ... As a person who pays a lot of taxes, I think it is necessary to increase welfare. Whenever I think, “why am I not getting anything back?”, I get angry as a citizen of the country who pays taxes” (female, 1997, Group 3).

In sum, the in-depth interview analysis provides evidence that different generations experienced different trajectories of political socialization. As senior subjects in my interview directly experienced Park’s developmental state during their impressionable years, the

socialization process – via the governmental programs and experience of economic success – embedded the pro-development norms into their nationalism. By internalizing the norms of diligence, thrift and saving, and sacrifice and collaboration, they increase their support for development while decreasing their demand for redistribution. Conversely, younger subjects do not connect their national sentiments to their economic preferences. Instead, they tend to shape their preferences for redistribution based on their own economic self-interests. Next, I turn to survey data analysis to examine whether the pattern that my theory and interview analysis suggest appears in a nationally representative survey.

Survey Data Analysis

Data and Variables

For survey data analysis, I use the cumulative version of the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) 2003-2021 (Kim et al. 2022). The KGSS, just like the General Social Survey (GSS) in the United States, has been conducted every year since 2003 with a nationally representative sample and through a face-to-face survey. Its key questions that I use in analysis below are comparable to those of the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).

The dependent variable is individuals' redistribution preferences. To measure it, I use the following two questions: first, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement where (1) represented “strongly agree” and (5) represented “strongly disagree”: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes” (*government responsibility*). Though this question was only included in the KGSS in 2003,

2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2021 (N=8,600), it is equivalent to that of the ISSP (Steele 2016). For ease of interpretation, I reversed the coding of the responses and collapsed the two of opposing governmental responsibility for redistribution: (1) “disagree” (11.3%); (2) “neither agree nor disagree” (19.6%); (3) “agree” (42.4%); and (4) indicates “strongly agree” (26.6%). Second, I also use the following question: “Please tell me the extent to which you agree to the statement below. (1) means you agree completely with the statement: ‘Income should become more equal’; (10) means you agree completely with the statement: ‘Income should be different depending on one’s own efforts’” (*income equality*). Although it was asked only in 2011 and 2014 (N=2,905), it is comparable to that of the WVS (Shayo 2009). Again, I reverse-coded the responses so that higher values indicate more favorable attitudes toward income equality (M=4.34; S.D.=2.35).

My key independent variable is *national pride*. Strictly speaking, national pride and national identification are related but different concepts. Because the latter, just like self-categorization, is about “the importance of national identity relative to other aspects of personal identity” (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016, 955), it is usually measured by asking respondents how strongly they identify with, for example, being American, or how close they feel to America (Wong 2010). In contrast, the former can be defined as central to patriotism, which is also closely related to nationalism (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), and it is regarded as “the positive affect that the public feel towards their country, resulting from their national identity” (Smith and Kim 2006, 127). Hence, given that nationalism in my theory is not a simple social category but social norms that contain meaningful contents based on the historical experiences of national development and its related values shaping personal norms, I claim that national pride is theoretically more appropriate than national identification because commitment to the

in-group norms is not captured by mere self-categorization (i.e., national identification) (Shayo 2009, 158). Moreover, given the fact that most South Koreans tend to strongly identify with being Korean due to the extremely high level of ethno-racial homogeneity (Hur 2022), the measure of national identification rarely varies, which offers empirical rationale for my use of national pride. Therefore, I measured national pride by asking respondents how proud they are of being South Korean. Since they selected one of the four-point scale responses from (1) “very proud” to (4) “not proud at all,” I again reversed the coding of the responses.

Another key variable in my analysis is *political generation* as a moderator. For its appropriate measure following the theory of generation effect (Krosnick and Alwin 1989), I distinguished five generations based on birth year by following past studies on political cohorts in South Korea (Hur 2017): (1) After 1981 (19.3%); (2) 1971-1981 (22.1%); (3) 1961-1970 (24.0%); (4) 1951-1960 (16.2%); (5) before 1951 (18.4%). If the prediction of Hypothesis 2 is correct, the negative relationship between national pride and redistribution preferences (Hypothesis 1) will appear stronger among the cohort born in between 1951 and 1960 because they directly experienced Park’s developmental state (1961-1979). In other words, during their impressionable years under Park, they “became an active participant in the adult world by shaping the basic values, attitudes, and world views” (Krosnick and Alwin 1989, 416).

Relying on the literature on redistribution preferences, I include political and socio-demographic covariates in the models: political ideology (1 = “very liberal”; 3 = “moderate”;

5 = “very conservative”);¹⁴ subjective class identification (1 = “bottom”; 10 = “top”);¹⁵ age (continuous); gender (1 = “female”; 0 = “male”); education (1 = “under high school graduation”; 2 = “high school graduation”; 3 = “college/university”; 4 = “graduate”); religiosity (0 = “no religion”; 1 = “have a religion”). I also include a set of dummy variables for region (residential province) and year fixed effects to control for regional and temporal contextual factors that might affect redistribution preferences though not included in the models. All variables are rescaled to 0-1 and Appendix 3 presents their summary statistics. Given the two dependent variables are continuous, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.

Findings

Figure 3 shows the key findings from the estimates.¹⁶ As Hypothesis 1 predicts, on average, South Koreans with higher levels of national pride are less likely to prefer redistribution. The two panels in the figure demonstrate that as national pride strengthens, the preferences for redistribution – both *government responsibility* and *income equality* – decreases: the min-max change of national pride, on average, weakens each measure from 0.64 to 0.60 and from 0.40 to 0.36 on the 0 to 1 scale, respectively. Although the pattern in the figure demonstrates my


¹⁴ Though I control for *political ideology*, I do not include *partisanship*. This is because given that national sentiments are closely intertwined with major political parties in South Korea (Steinberg and Shin 2006), it can cause the problem of posttreatment bias (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016). Yet, the inclusion of it does not produce results different from those reported in the manuscript.

¹⁵ I include *class* instead of *income* because the time span of the KGSS (2003-2021) can lead to varying values of income level in different years despite the same face value. For example, the monthly household income of 5,000,000 won in 2021 should have a quite different substantive value compared to that in 2003. Furthermore, scholars find that one’s subjective income group identification, not objective income, plays a central role in shaping redistribution preferences (Cansunar 2021).

¹⁶ The full results of regression estimates are shown in Appendix 4. Alternative specifications, including OLS models with standard errors clustered by region instead of fixed effects and ordered logistic regression models for *government responsibility*, produce results that are not substantively different from those in Figure 3 (See Appendix 6).

argument that the negative association between nationalism and redistributive preferences is from the pro-development national ideologies as social norms established during the past developmental state, it needs further investigation. Hence, relying on the logic of political socialization as evidenced by my interview analysis above, I examine whether those who directly experienced Park’s developmental state are more likely to shape developmentalist nationalism and show weaker preferences for redistribution.

Figure 3 Nationalism and Redistribution Preferences




Notes: Predicted values are from estimates in Appendix 4. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. All variables rescaled 0-1 and covariates fixed at their means or medians.

The panels in Figure 4 present the relationship between national pride and preferences over redistribution depending on political generations.¹⁷ According to the figure, the negative

¹⁷ The full results of regression estimates are shown in Appendix 5. Alternative specifications, including interaction models, OLS models with standard errors clustered by region instead of fixed effects, and ordered logistic regression models for *government responsibility*, produce results that are not substantively different from those in Figure 4 (See Appendix 7).

relationship between the two is stronger among those born in between 1951 and 1960, who experienced political socialization under Park, as Hypothesis 2 predicts. Given the min-max change of national pride, *government responsibility* and *income equality* decrease by about 0.08 and about 0.13, respectively. In contrast, for other cohorts, the two relationships are either weaker or null. This implies that though the observed general pattern of the negative relationship between nationalism and redistributive preferences in South Korea is not different from that of advanced democracies (Shayo 2009), the underlying mechanisms are sharply contrasting: the negative relationship comes primarily from *attachment* to the developmentalist nationalism and acceptance of its related values as social norms in new democracies such as South Korea, whereas the same pattern in the advanced democracies is the result of *detachment* from lower status of class identity while seeking higher status of national identity (Shayo 2009).

Figure 4 Nationalism and Redistribution Preferences by political generation



Notes: Coefficients are from estimates in Appendix 5. Bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. All variables rescaled 0-1. Covariates are included but not reported.

In sum, the survey data analysis in this section shows the general pattern of the negative relationship between nationalism and redistribution preferences. Moreover, it shows that the relationship varies depending on political generations. Due to different trajectories of political socialization, the degree to which citizens establish the pro-development nationalism as social norms and the way that they shape attitudes toward redistribution are different. In addition, at the elite-level, given that political leaders' backgrounds affect welfare policies (Han and Han 2021), the fact that elected officials who belong to 'the older cohort' in my analysis have occupied more than 70% of the National Assembly of South Korea suggests that my theoretical mechanisms can operate at both the public level and the elite level.¹⁸ In short, nationalism sustains South Korea's small welfare state.

Conclusion

Scholars have long been interested in public opinion on inequality and redistribution (Svallfors 1997; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Shayo 2009; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Aarøe and Petersen 2014; Trump 2018). However, previous studies have paid particular attention to the Western advanced democracies for both theoretical discussion and empirical analysis. As a result, we have relatively little understanding of how citizens in new democracies shape their public opinion about inequality and redistribution. In this study, I provided a novel theoretical perspective to explain public beliefs about redistribution in new democracies by focusing on nationalist legacies from past authoritarian regimes. I argued that authoritarian leaders, when confronted with twin challenges of nation-building and modernization, tend to use nationalist ideologies as the core spirit for rapid and successful national economic development. As a

¹⁸ Source: Republic of Korea National Election Commission (NEC)

result, citizens are likely to shape pro-development norms based on their national sentiments.

To test my argument, I employed a mixed-method approach in South Korea, which is one of the most dynamic developmental states as well as one of the leading democracies in Asia. First, my in-depth interview analysis revealed that the nationalism formed during the developmental state reduces support for redistribution while making citizens adhere to the national development based on pro-development norms. Through governmental programs and experiences of economic success, citizens have established core values such as diligence, thrift and saving, and sacrifice and collaboration in the nationalism for the national economic development. As a result, they tend to regard demanding more redistribution as an obstacle to economic development and even a betrayal of the nation. Second, my quantitative analysis with a nationally representative survey provides additional empirical evidence for my theoretical argument: those with higher levels of national pride tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution. Moreover, the pattern appears more robust among the cohort who directly experienced the past development state.

Although my empirical findings are from the case of South Korea, they provide broader and more general implications to the existing literature. First, in terms of the welfare states and public opinion on redistribution in new democracies, this study provides an answer to the important question in comparative politics: why democratization does not necessarily lead to higher levels of redistribution, especially in the third-wave democracies? Despite the conventional wisdom that the provision of welfare policies should be more widespread and have broader coverage in democracies than autocracies (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008), democracies do not necessarily result in higher levels of welfare spending (Ross 2006; Holland 2017; Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018). This study joins

the literature by suggesting that new democracies are not free from the past regime. More importantly, I demonstrate that nationalism plays an important role in retaining the accumulated stock of the past. In other words, I provide a novel explanation on the mechanisms through which new democracies that experienced intertwined challenges of nation-building and modernization cannot expand the provision of redistributive policies.

Second, in addition to the implication for the literature on redistribution in new democracies, this study also contributes particularly to the literature on small welfare states in East Asia. With a focus on cultural obstacles that Confucianism produces, many scholars have claimed that East Asians think and behave based on the Confucian traditions and, thus, tend to rely on their own families, rather than state, for their welfare (Rose and Shiratori 1986; Shin and Shaw 2003). However, their explanation suffers from endogeneity problems such that advanced welfare states in the West such as Norway and Sweden also showed similar patterns before developing their welfare systems (Esping-Andersen 1997). It implies that that underdeveloped welfare systems have led the Confucianism to remain as a long-lasting effect in the region, not vice versa. In this vein, I provide an alternative theory, above and beyond the cultural explanation, about why and how East Asians have weaker support for redistribution and thus small welfare states. Because some have already tried to link the developmental state to small welfare states in East Asia (Holliday 2000; Kwon 2005), they may criticize that it could be logically weak since it has been more than 30 years after the end of the developmental state (Dostal 2010). However, I expect my theory based on nationalist legacies to contribute to the discussion by shedding new light on the micro-level psychological mechanisms that sustain weak welfare system in the region. That is, citizens, as well as political elites, in new democracies who experienced the past developmental states still adhere to national economic

growth while regarding generous welfare as an obstacle to it and even a betrayal of the nation.

Third, my study makes significant contributions to the identity-based theories about preferences for redistribution. Because national identification in my theory contains values and meanings, citizens establish social and personal norms based on the nationalism. As a result, they judge what is good, valuable, and even morally right or wrong – especially for national economic growth. This particular perspective on nationalism is different from the prior studies that focus on shared ethnic and racial identities and tend to regard them as social categories to divide in-group and out-group members as welfare recipients (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Rueda and Stegmüller 2019). Therefore, I claim that national identification is not simply empty vessels but, instead, it contains meaningful contents such as norms and values based on its historical trajectories.

Lastly, although this study similarly predicts the negative relationship between nationalism and redistribution attitudes as Shayo (2009) demonstrates in advanced democracies, the underlying mechanism in my theory is different. Specifically, the negative relationship in the established democracies appears as a result of *detachment* from economy (i.e., lower status of class identity among the poor), whereas my theory suggests that the same pattern may come from *attachment* to economy (i.e., national development) in the third-wave democracies.

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
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Appendix 1 The Charter of National Education



Source: Park Chung Hee Presidential Museum, Seoul

In English, it states: We were born into this land charged with the historic mission to revitalize our nation. This is our moment to establish a self-reliant posture at home and contribute to the common prosperity of mankind globally, by reawakening the illustrious spirit of our forefathers. We hereby declare our path forward and set the goals of our education.

With sincerity in our minds and strength in our bodies, we shall engage in scholarship and the arts, develop the innate faculties in each of us, and using the current challenges as stepping stones for speedy progress, cultivate our creative power and pioneering spirit. We shall give foremost consideration to public good and order, place value on efficiency and substance, and inheriting the tradition of mutual assistance rooted in love and respect and faithfulness, inspire a cheerful and warm spirit of cooperation. Realizing that a nation grows

through creativity and cooperation and that individual growth is grounded in the prosperity of the nation, we shall do our best to fulfill the responsibility and duty attendant upon our freedom and rights and to raise the national consciousness to participate and serve in building our nation.

The love of country and fellow countrymen, together with the spirit of democracy that resists communism, paves the way for our survival and lays the ground for realizing the ideals of the free world. Looking forward to the glory of a unified homeland for our posterity, and as an industrious people with confidence and pride, let us pledge to make new history with ceaseless effort and the collective wisdom of the whole nation.

Appendix 2 Interview Protocol

The topic of this interview is about national pride and welfare attitudes. First, are you proud of your nation, South Korea?

1. Tell me about your opinion on the economic development under Park.
 - Tell me about your (and/or your family) life during the period.
 - How do you remember the societal and political atmosphere during the period?
 - How can you describe the roles of political leaders and citizens during the period?
 - Tell me about positive/negative memories/aspects about the period.
2. Tell me about your opinion on the current economic situation in South Korea.
 - Tell me how you understand/perceive the current national and personal economy.
 - How do you perceive economic inequality?
 - What is the reason of economic inequality and poverty?
3. Tell me about your opinion on welfare and redistributive policies.
 - What is the meaning and the expected role of welfare?
 - What kinds of welfare policies do you think we need?
 - Who do you think should benefit from welfare policies?
4. Tell me about your opinion on the relationship between welfare and economic growth.
 - From a national perspective, how do you understand the relationship?
 - From a personal perspective, how do you understand the relationship?
 - Why do you agree/disagree with welfare policies?
 - Why do you agree/disagree with policies for national economic development?

Appendix 3 Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Government responsibility	8,545	0.614	0.314	0	1
Income equality	2,892	0.371	0.261	0	1
National pride	8,473	0.704	0.238	0	1
Generations (birth year)	8,529
After 1981	1,644	.	.	0	1
1971-1981	1,883	.	.	0	1
1961-1970	2,050	.	.	0	1
1951-1960	1,385	.	.	0	1
Before 1951	1,567	.	.	0	1
Political ideology	8,163	0.500	0.249	0	1
Class	8,528	0.413	0.181	0	1
Age	8,529	45.416	16.377	18	94
Gender (female)	8,545	0.540	0.498	0	1
Education	8,538	0.442	0.286	0	1
Religiosity	8,517	0.564	0.495	0	1

Source: KGSS (2003-2021)

Appendix 4 Regression Estimates: national pride and redistribution

Variable	OLS Coefficient (Standard Errors)	
	Government responsibility	Income Equality
	Model 1	Model 2
National pride	-0.033* (0.015)	-0.049* (0.021)
Generations (birth year)		
After 1981	-0.003 (0.027)	0.102* (0.041)
1971-1981	0.003 (0.019)	0.067* (0.028)
1961-1970	0.004 (0.013)	0.041* (0.020)
Before 1951	-0.006 (0.017)	0.017 (0.024)
Political ideology	-0.073** (0.014)	-0.058** (0.020)
Class	-0.111** (0.020)	-0.113** (0.027)
Age	0.0005 (0.0008)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	0.002 (0.007)	0.013 (0.010)
Education	-0.026 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.022)
Religiosity	0.014* (0.007)	-0.017 (0.010)
Constant	0.785** (0.044)	0.366** (0.070)
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.0378	0.0191
<i>N</i>	8,062	2,769

Notes: **p<0.01, *p<0.05 (two-tailed). Coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions with all variables rescaled 0-1 (except *age*). Baseline of *generations* is the cohort born in between 1951 and 1960.

Appendix 5 Regression Estimates: national pride and redistribution by generation

Variable	OLS Coefficient (Standard Errors)									
	Government responsibility					Income Equality				
	Model 3 (Before 1951)	Model 4 (1951-1960)	Model 5 (1961-1970)	Model 6 (1971-1981)	Model 7 (After 1981)	Model 8 (Before 1951)	Model 9 (1951-1960)	Model 10 (1961-1970)	Model 11 (1971-1981)	Model 12 (After 1981)
National pride	-0.010 (0.037)	-0.085* (0.037)	0.011 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.031)	-0.056 (0.034)	-0.071 (0.055)	-0.131* (0.060)	-0.017 (0.043)	-0.047 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.040)
Political ideology	-0.070* (0.032)	-0.081* (0.035)	-0.061* (0.028)	-0.098** (0.030)	-0.066* (0.033)	0.037 (0.048)	-0.054 (0.055)	-0.060 (0.042)	-0.110* (0.043)	-0.121** (0.041)
Class	-0.081 (0.046)	-0.130** (0.049)	-0.078 (0.042)	-0.121** (0.044)	-0.168** (0.047)	-0.093 (0.064)	-0.040 (0.076)	-0.125* (0.058)	-0.163** (0.061)	-0.153** (0.058)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.0004 (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.0008 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female	-0.036 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)	0.042** (0.014)	0.043 (0.028)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.016 (0.021)	0.003 (0.020)	0.0008 (0.018)
Education	-0.026 (0.037)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.047 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.058 (0.044)	-0.096 (0.052)	0.026 (0.056)	0.029 (0.046)	0.029 (0.051)	-0.058 (0.059)
Religiosity	0.055** (0.019)	0.024 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.027 (0.015)	-0.076* (0.029)	0.002 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.019)
Constant	0.686** (0.096)	1.291** (0.154)	0.822** (0.102)	0.624** (0.082)	0.817** (0.060)	0.254 (0.150)	-0.104 (0.282)	0.754** (0.169)	0.525** (0.140)	0.579** (0.074)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.0341	0.0507	0.0315	0.0294	0.0519	0.0505	0.0085	0.0106	0.0137	0.0132
N	1,411	1,327	1,966	1,783	1,575	496	405	611	615	642

Notes: **p<0.01, *p<0.05 (two-tailed). Coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions with all variables rescaled 0-1 (except *age*).

Appendix 6 Alternative Specifications: national pride and redistribution

Variable	Coefficient (Standard Errors)		
	Government responsibility		Income Equality
	Model A1 (OLS)	Model A2 (Ordered Logit)	Model A3 (OLS)
National pride	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.179* (0.092)	-0.046* (0.022)
Generations (birth year)			
After 1981	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.037 (0.167)	0.104 (0.056)
1971-1981	0.002 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.115)	0.069 (0.035)
1961-1970	0.004 (0.003)	0.024 (0.081)	0.041* (0.020)
Before 1951	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.051 (0.104)	0.018 (0.022)
Political ideology	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.456*** (0.085)	-0.058** (0.021)
Class	-0.111*** (0.019)	-0.753*** (0.123)	-0.112*** (0.015)
Age	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	0.002 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.042)	0.013 (0.008)
Education	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.187** (0.093)	-0.011 (0.012)
Religiosity	0.013 (0.011)	0.087** (0.042)	-0.019* (0.008)
Constant / Cut point 1	0.783*** (0.025)	-3.184 (0.268)	0.366** (0.106)
Cut point 2		-1.914 (0.267)	
Cut point 3		-0.005 (0.266)	
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered Standard Errors	Yes	No	Yes
R-squared	0.0399		0.0218
Akaike's Inf. Cri.		20331.18	
Bayesian Inf. Cri.		20499.06	
N	8,062	8,062	2,769

Notes: *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.1$ (two-tailed). All variables rescaled 0-1 (except *age*). Baseline of *generations* is the cohort born in between 1951 and 1960.

Appendix 7 Alternative Specifications: national pride and redistribution by generation

Variable	Coefficient (Standard Errors)				
	Government responsibility			Income Equality	
	Model A4 (OLS)	Model A5 (OLS)	Model A6 (Ordered Logit)	Model 7 (OLS)	Model A8 (OLS)
National pride	-0.096*** (0.035)	-0.095** (0.037)	-0.498** (0.217)	-0.115** (0.054)	-0.112** (0.031)
Generations (birth year)					
After 1981	-0.035 (0.043)	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.193 (0.262)	0.026 (0.063)	0.029 (0.064)
1971-1981	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.043 (0.033)	-0.210 (0.231)	0.023 (0.056)	0.026 (0.028)
1961-1970	-0.067* (0.035)	-0.066 (0.042)	-0.373* (0.217)	-0.027 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.038)
Before 1951	-0.077* (0.042)	-0.077 (0.058)	-0.433* (0.256)	-0.005 (0.063)	-0.005 (0.030)
National pride × Generations					
After 1981	0.041 (0.050)	0.040 (0.074)	0.201 (0.299)	0.110 (0.069)	0.109** (0.029)
1971-1981	0.065 (0.047)	0.063 (0.049)	0.267 (0.289)	0.059 (0.069)	0.057* (0.023)
1961-1970	0.099** (0.046)	0.098 (0.062)	0.560** (0.285)	0.095 (0.069)	0.096** (0.033)
Before 1951	0.093* (0.049)	0.094 (0.078)	0.505* (0.305)	0.031 (0.073)	0.032 (0.052)
Political ideology	-0.073*** (0.014)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.457*** (0.085)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.060** (0.021)
Class	-0.111*** (0.020)	-0.110*** (0.019)	-0.751*** (0.123)	-0.112*** (0.027)	-0.112*** (0.015)
Age	0.0006 (0.0008)	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.042)	0.013 (0.010)	0.013 (0.008)
Education	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.025* (0.011)	-0.187** (0.093)	-0.015 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.012)
Religiosity	0.014** (0.007)	0.013 (0.011)	0.087** (0.042)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.020* (0.009)
Constant / Cut point 1	0.830*** (0.050)	0.829*** (0.013)	-3.417 (0.303)	0.414*** (0.079)	0.413 (0.114)
Cut point 2			-2.147 (0.301)		
Cut point 3			-0.237 (0.300)		
Region Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered Standard Errors	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.0380	0.0406		0.0189	0.0230
Akaike's Inf. Cri.			20334.16		
Bayesian Inf. Cri.			20530.02		
N	8,062	8,062	8,062	2,769	2,769

Notes: *** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.1$ (two-tailed). All variables rescaled 0-1 (except *age*). Baseline of *generations* is the cohort born in between 1951 and 1960.